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Three experiments investigated the effects of positive mood on perceptions of variability within
and between groups. Participants formed impressions of two different and highly variable
groups under a neutral or positive mood. When participants expected to learn about both
groups, positive mood increased perceived intergroup similarity but did not affect perceived
intragroup variability. In contrast, when participants expected to learn about only one group,
judgments of intergroup and intragroup similarity were both affected by mood. Mood and the
intergroup context influenced the nature and degree of information processing and resultant
judgments of variability in social groups. 
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TRANSIENT mood states can have a profound
impact both on what (e.g. Berkowitz, 1993;
Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992;
Schwarz & Clore, 1996) and how (e.g. Ashby,
Isen, & Turken, 1999; Bless, Schwarz, & Kem-
melmeier, 1996; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988;
Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Worth & Mackie, 1987)
people think. Although typically ephemeral,
moods have been shown to influence a broad
array of important mental phenomena such as
judgments of risk (Leith & Baumeister, 1996),
estimates of life satisfaction (Schwarz & Clore,
1996), and decisions about prosocial behavior
(Isen, 1987). Moreover, judgments and actions
can be influenced by incidental affect (Boden-
hausen, 1993), moods that arise from a trivial
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weather, receiving a candy bar, or watching a
segment of a comedy television show can
influence information processing about situ-
ations, the self, and others.
Given the central role of information pro-
cessing in stereotyping (see Hamilton &
Sherman, 1994), it is not surprising that moods
have also been shown to impact judgments of
groups and their members (Bodenhausen,
Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Moreno, 2001; Mackie &
Hamilton, 1993; Park & Banaji, 2000).
However, in contrast to earlier speculations that
positive affect during intergroup encounters
might lead to improved relations (e.g. Allport,
1954; Amir, 1969; Brewer & Miller, 1984) or
favorable judgments (e.g. Bower, 1991; Forgas,
1995), positive moods have under some circum-
stances produced unfavorable and negative
judgments of groups. Positive moods have been
shown to increase use of stereotypes (Bless,
Schwarz & Kemmelmeier, 1996; Bless & Fiedler,
1995; Forgas & Fiedler, 1996; Stroessner &
Mackie, 1992), particularly in the absence of
cues suggesting that stereotype use should be
avoided (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser,
1994; Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2000). 
The reason why stereotyping increases under
positive mood has been a matter of some
debate. Some theories link positive moods to
stereotyping through decreases in deliberative
processing; when systematic processing is diffi-
cult or unpalatable, stereotypes serve as readily
available heuristics to guide judgment and
behavior. According to these views, positive
moods tend to diminish the willingness to
thoroughly evaluate available information for a
number of reasons. One account (Isen, 1987;
Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995) attributes
decreased deliberative processing to a moti-
vation to maintain positive mood. A second
account (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1996)
suggests that positive mood indicates that the
environment is secure and nonthreatening, sig-
naling that deliberative processing is unneces-
sary. Both accounts also allow for the possibility
of greater systematic processing (and, presum-
ably, reduced stereotyping) under some con-
ditions. Deliberative processing under positive
mood might occur if available information is
interesting or enjoyable to process (Isen, 1993),
is highly discrepant with expectations (suggest-
ing that reliance on a stereotype is inappro-
priate) (Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2000), or when
accountability for judgments is increased
(Bodenhausen et al., 1994). In the absence of
these factors, however, systematic processing of
available information is reduced when people
are in a happy mood, increasing the use of
available stereotypes (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz,
& Strack, 1990; Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992;
Mackie, & Worth, 1989; Melton, 1995; Sinclair
& Mark, 1995).
Given that positive mood tends to increase
reliance on stereotypes, one interesting
question regards how positive mood might
impact the processing of information about
novel groups for which no stereotype is avail-
able. Since no stereotype is available in these
situations to guide impression formation, one
might expect that positive moods might actually
increase deliberative processing. In fact, there
is evidence that positive moods might serve to
increase processing regarding novel groups.
Positive affect has been shown to enhance cog-
nitive flexibility and creativity, particularly on
tasks that are enjoyable (Isen, 1993). Happy
individuals show enhanced verbal fluency on a
creative uses test (Phillips, Bull, Adams, &
Fraser, 2002), generate more unusual associ-
ations (Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson,
1985), and demonstrate greater flexibility in
adopting new rules in information processing
(Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) than individuals
in a neutral mood. Murray, Sujan, Hirt, and
Sujan (1990), for example, showed that happy
individuals were better able to generate both
similarities and differences when comparing
TV shows and their characters, depending on
the task requirements. These studies suggest
that in the absence of pre-existing stereotypes,
happy individuals might show deliberative pro-
cessing of information about novel groups. 
Other studies, however, suggest that happy
individuals’ deficits in processing are not
restricted to domains in which heuristics such
as stereotypes are available. Several studies
suggest that happiness can undermine effective
functioning of executive control (Spies, Hesse,
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(1)
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& Hummitzsch, 1996), leading to increased dis-
tractibility (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) and
poor performance on demanding cognitive
tasks (Phillips et al., 2002). These effects are
particularly prounounced on tasks that are not
seen as enjoyable (Isen, 1999; Phillips et al.,
2002). Within social cognition, people in a
positive mood do not appear to differentially
attend to and weight infrequent, distinctive, or
extreme information compared with people in
a neutral mood (Blessum, Lord, & Sia, 1998;
Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, Niedenthal, &
Cantor, 1992; Stroessner, Hamilton, & Mackie,
1992, Experiment 2; Stroessner & Mackie,
1992). For example, happy individuals have
been shown to judge a group of diverse indi-
viduals to be as homogeneous as a group with
low diversity (Queller, Mackie, & Stroessner,
1996; Stroessner & Mackie, 1992, 1993) and
they recalled items reflecting relatively low
behavioral variability (Stroessner & Mackie,
1992, Experiment 2). These results suggest that
good mood can decrease deliberative process-
ing of information about novel groups, increas-
ing perceived homogeneity and thereby
undermining one of the potential benefits of
intergroup contact (Linville, Salovey, & Fischer,
1986; Quattrone, 1986; Wilder, 1986).
In sum, the literature suggests that positive
mood produces effects that depend on the
nature of the task and the attitude of the per-
ceiver. Happiness tends to increase creativity
and flexibility in thinking, but at the cost of per-
sistence and deliberation. On tasks that require
flexibility, positive mood will appear to convey
an advantage, whereas the opposite will be true
on tasks that require focus and deliberation.
Moreover, even the negative consequences of
positive mood can be attenuated when indi-
viduals are highly motivated to engage in delib-
erative processing, such as when the task is seen
as pleasant and enjoyable. Most evidence to
date, however, shows that positive moods detri-
mentally affect perceptions of novel groups,
suggesting that perceivers generally do not
experience forming impressions of novel
groups as inherently enjoyable. 
Possible positive consequences of
positive affect for intergroup
perception
Given the varied effects of mood on infor-
mation processing, it is possible that positive
affect might simultaneously produce both
beneficial and detrimental consequences on
different aspects of group judgments. In review-
ing their research showing that happy indi-
viduals failed to recognize within-group
variability, Stroessner and Mackie (1993; see
also Mackie, Queller, Stroessner, & Hamilton,
1996) suggested that the processes that
produce a failure to differentiate within groups,
while harming intragroup perception, might
benefit intergroup perception. Although positive
mood decreases recognition of variability
within a single group, the reduced recognition
of difference might be desirable when indi-
viduals are forming impressions of multiple
groups or are comparing an outgroup with an
ingroup. Positive mood might decrease the
recognition of distinctions between members of
different groups, possibly producing the per-
ception of high intergroup similarity. 
Although the effect of mood on simul-
taneous judgments of similarity within and
between novel groups has not been examined,
there exists some indirect support in the litera-
ture for the notion that positive mood might
increase perceived similarity between groups.
In one study (Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, &
Lowrance, 1995), perceivers’ affective states
were manipulated to assess the impact on the
salience of group boundaries. Specifically,
participants were either given a candy bar to
induce a positive mood or experienced no
mood manipulation and were then asked to
view a videotape of several members of an
outgroup with whom their group would later
interact. After viewing the videotape, partici-
pants judged whether during their upcoming
interaction they thought they would feel like
members of a single, superordinate group or
whether they would feel like members of two
separate groups. Participants in a positive mood
were more likely to anticipate that they would
view the aggregate as a single group and less as
Stroessner et al. mood and variability
7
01 GPI 048619 (to/d)  8/12/04  12:18 pm  Page 7
two distinct groups than did participants who
had not undergone the mood induction. 
Although this finding supports the predic-
tion of reduced group differentiation by indi-
viduals in a positive mood, there remain some
ambiguities and unresolved questions. First,
participants in the Dovidio et al. (1995) experi-
ment did not directly judge the similarity of the
outgroup to their own group. Instead, partici-
pants indicated whether they would expect to
view the members of the other group as belong-
ing to a single, superordinate group during
some future interaction. Although judgments
of expected inclusiveness and similarity might
correlate, they are theoretically distinguishable
and might be differently impacted by other
variables. Second, the targets in the Dovidio et
al. study were purportedly members of an
outgroup. Perceptions of outgroup members
have been shown to be affected by a number of
motivational variables, suggesting that the
obtained results might have arisen from
motivational factors to reduce or increase
intergroup differentiation independent of
thoroughness of processing issues (Forgas &
Fiedler, 1996; Forgas & Moylan, 1991). Third, it
is also unclear whether the effects reflect the
impact of positive mood, per se, or emerged
because participants in the positive mood con-
dition underwent an experimental manipu-
lation whereas the other participants did not. It
is possible that this manipulation might have
had a number of consequences in addition to
altering mood. For example, the experimental
manipulation might have distracted partici-
pants in the positive mood condition or led
participants to be generous and inclusive in
exchange for the gift.
Fourth, and most crucial in our view, it would
be desirable to assess within a single experi-
ment the simultaneous impact of positive mood
on perceptions of both within- and between-
group variability. To date, one set of studies has
shown that positive mood decreased the per-
ceived variability within a single group and
another study has shown decreased intergroup
differentiation between two groups. What
remains unclear is the impact of positive mood
on both perceptions when multiple groups are
judged. Given the importance of both intra-
group variability and between-group differ-
ences for differentiation and, ultimately, for
intergroup relations (Campbell, 1956; Ford &
Stangor, 1992; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead,
1998; Krueger & Rothbart, 1990; Rothbart,
Davis-Stitt, & Hill, 1997), it is important to
examine simultaneously the impact of positive
mood on the perception of differentiation both
within and between groups. To our knowledge,
no study yet has done so. 
Experiment 1
The primary goal of Experiment 1 was to
examine the effects of positive mood on the
perception of variability within and between
novel groups. Before learning about two
groups, participants experienced a manipu-
lation designed to induce a positive or a neutral
mood. Therefore, the two conditions differed
only in the affective implications of the mood
manipulation and not in whether participants
experienced a manipulation of mood.
Moreover, because the participants were
members of neither group, no motivational
factors to distinguish or diminish the perceived
difference between ingroups and outgroups
should have been activated. 
Following the mood induction, participants
were presented with information describing
groups that were clearly distinct from one
another (i.e. the groups were on average very
different) but also contained a high degree of
within-group variability (i.e. the groups were
very heterogeneous). Participants judged the
similarity of the group members to one another
and the degree that the groups were similar to
each other. 
Based on the reduced recognition and pro-
cessing of atypical or distinctive information by
individuals in a positive mood, we predicted
that positive mood should lead to reduced per-
ceptions of intragroup variability as has been
reported in previous studies (Queller et al.,
1996; Stroessner & Mackie, 1992, 1993). It was
also expected that individuals in a good mood
would see the two groups as more similar to one
another than would individuals in a neutral
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(1)
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mood. Why would positive mood increase
rather than decrease perceived intergroup simi-
larity? Because the groups were very different
from one another, we expected that the less
deliberative processing typically associated with
positive mood would make recognition of those
differences more difficult. Moreover, because
the groups were novel, there would be no
general knowledge structures (i.e. stereotypes
or expectancies) suggesting that the groups
would be highly dissimilar. Individuals in a
positive mood therefore would be less likely to
detect substantial real group differences than
would individuals in a neutral mood. If these
results emerged, this would suggest that positive
mood might simultaneously harm (by reducing
intragroup differentiation) and help (by
reducing intergroup differentiation) percep-
tions of groups. 
Method
Participants A total of 67 undergraduates
enrolled in an introductory psychology course
participated in the experiment in exchange for
partial course credit. Participants were
randomly assigned in groups of two to eight to
one of the eight conditions created by crossing
the mood (good vs. neutral), group order
(Group A first vs. Group B first), and mood
stimulus order (order 1 vs. order 2) variables. 
Stimulus materials
Behavioral sentences A pilot test was conducted
to create descriptions of two groups that
differed in valence but also showed a high
degree of within-group variability. Students (N
= 24) rated a total of 32 behavioral sentences in
terms of the desirability of the behavior
described (1 = not at all desirable, 9 = very
desirable). Based on these ratings, two sets of
stimulus sentences were created. A set of 12 sen-
tences was selected to describe the behaviors of
members of a hypothetical group of people
labeled Group A, and 12 sentences described
the members of Group B. Both the Group A
(SD = 1.6) and Group B sets (SD = 1.6) reflected
an identically high degree of within-group vari-
ability.1 However, the central tendency of the
two groups differed. Whereas the members of
Group A typically performed desirable, friendly
behaviors (M = 6.0), the members of Group B
acted in an undesirable, unfriendly manner (M
= 4.0). So, for example, a member of Group A
might have ‘planned the company picnic’ or
‘bought a present for a friend who was feeling
depressed’. A member of Group B, however,
might have ‘stolen valuables from a client’ or
‘bought her sister a dress that didn’t fit so that
she could borrow it’.
Mood-inducing video excerpts To ensure that
participants were in the same mood when pro-
cessing information about both groups, two
different video excerpts were selected for use in
each mood condition. The excerpts designed to
induce a positive mood showed two different
comics, each performing a stand-up routine.
The neutral mood videos showed these same
comics, but one was acting in a serious movie
scene and the other was being interviewed for
a television special. Pilot testing (N = 50), in
which students viewed only one of several
prospective excerpts and then rated their mood
(1 = sad, 9 = happy), indicated that mood
ratings were higher following the two selected
positive-mood excerpts (Ms = 7.1 and 7.3) than
following the two selected neutral-mood
excerpts (Ms = 5.4 and 5.2). Mood ratings
following the two excerpts within each con-
dition did not differ significantly (both Fs < 1). 
Procedure Student participants were wel-
comed by one of two experimenters and were
told that they would participate in two different
studies. The first study, participants were told,
was actually a pretest for a future experiment.
They were to watch two short (approximately 5
min) video excerpts that would be used in a
future study and were to answer several ques-
tions designed to assess their reactions. Partici-
pants were also told that because the
experimenters were concerned about their
seeing two excerpts in a row, the excerpts would
be separated by the first half of the second
study. After the first half of the second study was
completed, they then would view the second
clip and would finally complete the second half
of the second study. This procedure was used to
Stroessner et al. mood and variability
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ensure that participants were in the intended
mood while reading about both groups. The
video order was counterbalanced to minimize
the likelihood that judgments of a group could
be explained in terms of viewing a specific
video excerpt. 
Participants were then shown one of the
excerpts designed to induce either a positive
(i.e. happy) or a neutral mood. After viewing
this excerpt, participants completed a ques-
tionnaire containing several questions regard-
ing their responses to the video. Embedded
among these questions were two items designed
to assess the effectiveness of the mood manipu-
lation. The items were ‘How did the video make
you feel?’ and ‘How do you feel right now?’
(1 = sad, 9 = happy).
The participants were then told that they
would ‘read about some behaviors that were
performed by the members of a group’ and
that they would ‘later be asked some questions
that involved making some judgments about
the group’. Each group member who per-
formed a behavior, participants were told, was
to be identified by her first name, and each
group member performed only one behavior.
Booklets containing descriptions of behaviors
performed by the members of either Group A
or Group B were then distributed (group order
was counterbalanced). There was a single
behavioral description on each page, and the
descriptions appeared in a different random
order in each booklet. The experimenter paced
the participants through the booklets, allowing
six seconds per page. After the booklets were
collected, participants were given a sheet con-
taining numerous questions about the group.
We included a number of questions designed to
obscure our focus on perceived variability,
including questions about the perceived friend-
liness and intelligence of the groups’ members,
the likeability of the groups, and the similarity
of the group to the self. Embedded in these
items was one of the primary dependent
measures in the study, ‘How similar are the
members of this group to one another?’ (1 =
not at all similar, 9 = very similar). The pro-
cedure was then repeated using the video clip
and group behavioral descriptions that had not
yet been used. After these counterbalancing
procedures were completed, participants had
undergone two mood manipulations designed
to induce the same mood state and had read
about and judged the variability within both
groups.
Participants then completed a final question-
naire designed to assess perceptions of inter-
group similarity. This questionnaire contained
filler items and a series of questions about
group differences. Three of the items asked
about the degree to which the two groups were
similar (‘How similar (in general, in intelli-
gence, in friendliness) are members of Group
A to members of Group B?’ (9 = very similar)).
Because of Murray et al.’s (1990) finding that
happy individuals are more likely to detect both
similarities and differences between stimuli,
participants were asked three similar questions
phrased in terms of differences (‘How different
(in general, in intelligence, in friendliness) are
members of Group A from members of Group
B?’ (9 = very different)). After their last group
judgment, participants were again asked to
report their mood (‘How do you feel right
now?’ (9 = happy)). 
Results and discussion
Effectiveness of mood manipulations Re-
sponses to the mood manipulation checks were
analyzed to assess whether the video clips suc-
cessfully induced the intended moods. As
responses to the two manipulation check items
were highly correlated for both the first and
second mood inductions (rs = .75 and .71,
respectively), these items were averaged to
create two mood indexes. The scores were then
entered in a 2 (Mood)  2 (Induction) analysis
of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures
on the second factor. (Preliminary analyses
indicated that video order and group order
variables qualified none of the obtained
effects.) This analysis yielded a significant
Mood effect (F(1, 65) = 33.21, p < .001), indi-
cating that participants reported being happier
if they viewed the positive mood videos (M =
6.8) than if they viewed the neutral mood
videos (M = 5.5). The analysis also yielded a
significant Mood  Induction interaction (F(1,
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(1)
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65) = 5.25, p < .05). Separate analyses for the
first and second mood inductions indicated
that the first mood induction was highly
successful (Ms = 7.2 vs. 5.2 for the happy and
neutral conditions, respectively) (F(1, 65) =
43.95, p < .001). The second mood induction,
although successful, was less powerful (Ms = 6.5
vs. 5.7, respectively) (F(1, 65) = 4.97, p < .05).
Therefore, the desired mood states were suc-
cessfully induced by both manipulations. 
Analysis of the last mood manipulation check
indicated that participants’ moods in the
neutral (M = 5.5) and happy (M = 5.5) con-
ditions did not differ at the end of the experi-
ment.
Effects of mood on perceptions of variability
Within-group similarity Responses to the item
assessing perceived within-group similarity were
submitted to a 2 (Mood)  2 (Group: Group A
vs. Group B) ANOVA with repeated measures
on the second variable. This analysis yielded
only a Group main effect (F(1, 65) = 6.53, p <
.05), indicating that the members of Group B
(M = 5.8) were seen as more similar to one
another than the members of Group A (M =
5.0). As reflected in the equal means displayed
at the bottom of Table 1, the Mood main effect
was not significant (F < 1). Surprisingly, mood
effects on perceived variability within groups
were attenuated in this multiple group context.
Between-group differentiation Responses to the
questions assessing group differences were
analyzed separately, and mean responses are
displayed in Table 1. Responses to the items
about the general similarities and differences
between the groups both yielded significant
effects of mood. Individuals in a positive mood
perceived the groups as more similar (F(1, 65)
= 7.89, p < .01), and less different (F(1, 65) =
6.33, p < .05), than did individuals in a neutral
mood. The items focusing on differences and
similarities in friendliness yielded similar
effects. Happy participants reported viewing
the groups as more similar (F(1, 65) = 6.63, p <
.05), and less different (F(1, 65) = 5.09, p < .05),
than did participants in a neutral mood. Inter-
estingly, analyses of the items regarding
differentiation in intelligence produced no
significant effects (both ps > .40). Positive mood
therefore appeared to decrease perceived inter-
group differentiation, but this occurred
particularly on traits relevant to the behavior of
group members. 
The results of Experiment 1 extend our
understanding of mood effects on group per-
ception in several respects. Participants in a
good mood judged the members of the two
groups displaying real and pronounced group
differences as more similar (and less different)
than did participants in a neutral mood.
Because making distinctions between groups
Stroessner et al. mood and variability
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General similarity 3.3 4.4
Friendliness similarity 3.0 4.0 
Intelligence similarity 4.9 5.1
General difference 6.4 5.3 
Friendliness difference 6.6 5.6
Intelligence difference 4.8 4.8
Within-group similarity 5.4 5.4
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has been shown to produce ingroup bias and
discrimination against outgroups (see Brewer,
1979; Turner, 1991), this finding suggests that
positive mood might have some beneficial con-
sequences for intergroup interactions. 
Contrary to predictions and previous
findings, however, judgments of the variability
within the groups were unaffected by mood.
Participants in both a good and neutral mood
saw the groups as being equally (and highly)
similar, with both means above the scale
midpoint of 5. These findings suggest that the
recognition of diversity was poor in general,
even by those individuals in a neutral mood. 
One possible reason for this failure of partici-
pants to detect the high degree of intragroup
variability might relate to the multigroup
context of the study. Individuals in earlier
studies on mood and group impression for-
mation received information describing the
members of a single social group. In the
present experiments, however, individuals
expected to form impressions of two different
groups and indeed did so. Because perceivers
expected to read about two groups, it is possible
that they might not have seen the detection of
within-group differences as crucial to the task at
hand. If that were the case, individuals might
have focused on detecting differences between
the groups rather than variations within groups.
This possibility is consistent with the litera-
ture on context effects on social judgment
(Eiser, 1971; Krueger & Rothbart, 1990;
Krueger, Rothbart, & Sriram, 1989; Tajfel &
Wilkes, 1963; Wilder & Thompson, 1988). In
one classic experiment, Doise, Deschamps, and
Meyer (1978) asked participants to make trait
ratings of group members. Some participants
expected to rate members of only one group
(although they completed ratings of both
groups), whereas the other participants
expected to rate members of two different
groups. Participants who expected two groups
showed assimilation in their ratings of each
groups’ members and contrast between
members of different groups. Thus, the knowl-
edge that one will receive information about
more than one group appears to minimize
intragroup differentiation, presumably because
processing goals vary in single group versus
multiple group contexts. In the former case,
the perceiver tends to process information
describing group members with a goal or infer-
ring what group members are like ‘on average’
(i.e. the central tendency) and how they differ
from one another (i.e. intragroup variability).
In the latter case, perceivers appear less
inclined to focus on detecting variability within
either group, given that they might process the
information with the implicit goal of making
between-group comparisons. Although the
degree of overlap in the distributions of
different groups has been shown to affect judg-
ments (Ford & Stangor, 1992), it is not clear
that people appreciate the impact of variability
information (cf. Linville et al., 1986) and, con-
sequently, they may be less inclined to focus on
abstracting variability information when they
receive information about more than one
group. If so, this might attenuate mood effects
on perceived variability within groups, as was
found in Experiment 1.
This interpretation is speculative because
expectations about the number of groups that
would be encountered were not systematically
varied in our first experiment. Participants had
been forewarned that they would be reading
about two groups, so the effects of the
expectancy variable can only be inferred from
comparisons with previous experiments in
which information about only one group was
presented. A second experiment therefore was
conducted in which participants’ expectancies
regarding the number of groups they expected
to learn about was manipulated. We hypothe-
sized that the impact of mood on judgments of
within group similarity would depend on the
expected number of target groups. When
participants expected to form impressions of
two groups, we expected to replicate the
findings of Experiment 1. In contrast, when
participants expected to form an impression of
only one group, it was expected that people in
a neutral mood should better detect the low
similarity of the members of a highly variable
group, although this effect should apply only to
the first group encountered. Predictions for the
second group were more speculative, given the
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(1)
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possible changes in processing goals as a
function of introducing a multiple-group
context in the middle of the study. If infor-
mation describing a second group was pre-
sented after participants had been led to
believe that only one group would be
described, they might then change their infor-
mation processing strategy to detect between-
group differences.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was conducted with several goals
in mind. One goal was to replicate the finding
that positive mood reduces intergroup differ-
entiation. A second goal was to test the
interpretation that mood effects did not
emerge on perceived intragroup variability in
Experiment 1 because of the multigroup
context. To test this hypothesis, participants in
Experiment 2 were led to believe either that
they would form an impression of one group or
of two groups. A third goal was to collect a
measure that might shed light on the basis of
the obtained effects. We focused on partici-
pant’s free recall of presented behavioral
descriptions as a reflection of the degree of
deliberative processing. Accordingly, we
expected that participants in a neutral mood
would recall more items than would partici-
pants in a positive mood. 
Method
Participants A total of 118 undergraduates
recruited from the introductory psychology
pool were recruited for participation in
exchange for partial course credit. Participants
were randomly assigned in groups of two to
eight to one of four conditions created by
crossing the mood (good vs. neutral) and
expectancy (one group vs. two group) variables.
Procedure The procedure in Experiment 2
was similar to the procedure used in Experi-
ment 1, with several notable changes. To
simplify the design (and because of the lack of
order effects in Experiment 1), the target
groups and mood-inducing video excerpts were
presented in a set order in Experiment 2.
Participants’ expectations regarding the
number of groups they would read about were
also manipulated. Participants were led to
believe either that they would be receiving
information describing the members of one
group (one-group expectancy) or were given
the same instructions provided in Experiment 1
(two-group expectancy). Specifically, whereas
some participants were instructed that, ‘you will
read about some behaviors that were per-
formed by the members of a group that we are
calling Group A’, other participants were told
that they would ‘read about some behaviors
that were performed by the members of groups
that we are calling either Group A or Group B.
First you will be reading about the members of
Group A. Later, you will be reading about the
members of Group B’. In both cases, however,
participants read about the first group, Group
A, made an intragroup similarity judgment for
that group, and then were asked to form an
impression of another group, Group B. After
judging the variability with Group B, all partici-
pants judged the similarity of the two groups, as
in Experiment 1. Therefore, the key difference
between the two experiments was that indi-
viduals in the one group expectancy condition
of Experiment 2 thought they would only form
an impression of one group as they processed
the information describing the members of
Group A. Finally, after completing all judg-
ments of the groups, participants were given
three minutes to recall as many of the behav-
ioral sentences as they could.
Results and discussion
Effectiveness of mood manipulations Re-
sponses to the two manipulation check items
were again highly correlated for the first and
second mood inductions (rs = .79 and .70,
respectively), and they were therefore averaged
for each induction and submitted to a 2
(Mood)  2 (Expectancy)  2 (Induction)
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last
factor. Participants in the positive mood con-
dition reported being happier (M = 6.5) than
participants in the neutral mood condition (M
= 5.2) (F(1, 114) = 49.67, p < .001), and mood
ratings were generally higher after the first
Stroessner et al. mood and variability
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mood induction than after the second (Ms = 6.2
vs. 5.5, respectively) (F(1, 114) = 18.23, p <
.001). Separate one-way ANOVAs were signifi-
cant for both the first (F(1, 116) = 32.46, p <
.001), and second (F(1, 116) = 22.21, p < .001),
inductions, indicating that both manipulations
were successful in inducing the desired mood
states. As in Experiment 1, participants’ moods
in the neutral (M = 5.2) and happy (M = 5.0)
conditions did not differ at the end of the
experiment (F < 1).
Effects of mood on perceptions of variability
Within-group similarity Responses to the two
items assessing perceived within-group variabil-
ity were submitted to a 2 (Mood)  2
(Expectancy)  2 (Group) ANOVA with
repeated measures on the last variable. This
analysis yielded an Expectancy main effect (F(1,
114) = 7.40, p < .01), which was qualified by a
significant, predicted three-way interaction
(F(1, 114) = 4.90, p < .05) (see Figure 1). To
better understand the nature of the interaction,
separate 2 (Mood)  2 (Expectancy) ANOVAs
were conducted on the judgments of the two
groups. The analysis of the judgments of Group
A, the first group participants read about,
yielded a Mood effect (F(1, 114) = 3.83, p < .05),
an Expectancy effect (F(1, 114) = 6.72, p < .01),
and a significant Mood X Expectancy inter-
action (F(1, 114) = 5.03, p < .05). As displayed
in the top panel of Figure 1, participants who
expected to receive information about only one
group judged the members of Group A as more
similar to one another when they were in a
positive (M = 5.2) compared with a neutral
mood (M = 4.0) (F(1, 56) = 9.00, p < .01). In
contrast, judgments of Group A’s within-group
variability were not affected by mood when
participants expected to learn about two
groups (Ms = 5.3 vs. 5.4, respectively). Further-
more, the comparison examining the impact of
expectancy within the neutral mood condition
was significant (F(1, 56) = 13.43, p < .01),
whereas the identical analysis in the positive
mood condition was not (F < 1). Analyses of
judgments of the second group participants
read about, Group B (lower panel, Figure 1),
yielded no significant effects (all ps > .19). Con-
sistent with predictions, individuals in a neutral
mood were more likely to detect the variability
within a group when they expected to learn
only about that group. Individuals in a neutral
mood made higher similarity judgments, as
high as those of individuals in a positive mood,
when they expected to learn about two groups.
Between-group differentiation Replicating Experi-
ment 1, responses to the items about the
general similarities and differences of the
groups reflected significant effects of mood. As
can be seen in Table 2, individuals in a positive
mood perceived the groups as more similar
(F(1, 114) = 6.97, p < .01), and less different
(F(1, 113) = 4.33, p < .05), than individuals in a
neutral mood.2 Judgments of the differences
and similarities in friendliness yielded similar
effects. Participants in a happy mood viewed
the groups as more similar (F(1, 113) = 4.09, p
< .05), and marginally less different (F(1, 114)
= 3.17, p = .08), than did participants in a
neutral mood. Judgments of comparative intel-
ligence again produced no effects (both ps >
.50). Replicating the findings of Experiment 1,
positive mood decreased differentiation
between the groups in general and on relevant
traits in particular.
Free recall Recall data were analyzed to assess
the degree to which available information was
deliberatively processed. An experimenter
blind to experimental conditions coded the
free recall protocols using a ‘gist’ criterion, and
the total number of items recalled was calcu-
lated. It was expected that recall would be
higher in the neutral than positive mood con-
dition, indicating greater systematic processing
of the behavioral information. To test this
hypothesis, data were entered into a 2 (Mood)
 2 (Expectancy)  2 (Group) ANOVA with
repeated measures on the last factor. This
analysis yielded a Group main effect (F(1, 114)
= 36.87, p < .001), indicating that more items
were recalled that described Group B, the last
group about which participants read, than
Group A (Ms = 6.4 vs. 5.4, respectively). Of
greater theoretical interest was a marginally
significant effect of Mood (F(1, 114) = 3.60,
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(1)
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Figure 1. Judgments of within-group similarity of Group A (top panel) and Group B (bottom panel) as a
function of mood and expectancy, Experiment 2. 
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p = .06), indicating that, as predicted, partici-
pants in a neutral mood recalled more items
about each group (M = 6.1) than did partici-
pants in a good mood (M = 5.7). 
The data were generally consistent with pre-
dictions. Regarding the detection of variability
within groups, individuals expecting to form
impressions of a single group judged the group
as homogeneous when in a happy mood and
heterogeneous when in a neutral mood. When
they expected to learn about two groups,
however, perceived variability within the first
group was equally homogeneous. We believe
this to be the first evidence that group
expectancies and mood interact to affect per-
ceived variability within groups. Regarding dif-
ferentiation, the recall data provide some
support for the interpretation that positive
mood decreased differentiation because happi-
ness reduced deliberative processing of avail-
able information. The conditions in which
processing appeared less deliberate were also
the conditions in which similarity judgments
were highest. If low levels of deliberation
undermined differentiation, one might expect
that more deliberative processing (as reflected
in the amount of free recall) should be associ-
ated with greater differentiation between
groups (as reflected in the judgments of simi-
larity and difference). In fact, the mean
number of items recalled was significantly cor-
related with a composite of the differentiation
measures (the average of the difference and
reverse-scored similarity items) (r(117) = .30,
p < .01). 
Despite these generally supportive findings, a
third experiment was conducted with several
goals in mind. The main goal was to collect data
that could provide a stronger test of the role of
deliberative processing in the relation between
mood and differentiation. It was hoped that
Experiment 2 might allow a test of the media-
tional role of deliberative processing in the
relation between mood and differentiation.
However, a significant effect of the indepen-
dent variable (mood) on the potential
mediator (free recall) is necessary for such a
test, and this effect was only marginally signifi-
cant. In retrospect, we suspected that the
manner in which the recall data were collected
might have limited their usefulness for provid-
ing a direct test of this hypothesis. Because
Experiment 2 focused on variability judgments,
recall was collected after all other judgments
had been made. This was done so that the
collection of free recall would not contaminate
judgments of variability. However, it is quite
possible that the reverse occurred; free recall
might have been affected by the judgments that
had already been made. If so, the method in
Experiment 2 might have worked against the
use of recall as a measure of deliberative pro-
cessing since the quantity and content of recall
might have been contaminated by participants’
judgments. A superior approach, then, would
be to collect recall before group judgments are
made. This was one change that was made in
Experiment 3.
Experiment 3 
In addition to changing the timing of the
collection of free recall, we made several other
changes to rule out alternate explanations and
increase confidence in the generality of the
findings.3 First, a different mood manipulation
was used in Experiment 3. Showing similar
effects with different manipulations of mood
would enhance the likelihood that mood, and
not the nature or the content of the manipu-
lation, plays a causal role in affecting variability
judgments. Second, the nature of group differ-
ences was modified to remove valence as a basis
of group differentiation. Because the groups
differed in valence and the potential import-
ance of valence for individuals differing in
mood states, it seemed prudent to attempt a
replication with groups that differed in alter-
nate ways. Individuals in Experiment 3, there-
fore, formed impressions of groups that
differed on average in the positive character-
istic they tended to display. One group’s
members primarily acted in a friendly, and the
other primarily in an intelligent, manner. Third,
the order in which individuals were queried
about group differences was modified. In the
first two experiments, participants were asked
about similarities before being asked about
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(1)
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differences between groups. Although analyses
of these two items produced nearly identical
conclusions, it was possible that the ordering of
items might have artificially exaggerated
reported similarity particularly among happy
participants. As mentioned above, happy indi-
viduals in Murray et al.’s (1990) study showed
that they were able to generate more simi-
larities and more differences between stimuli
compared with individuals in a neutral mood. It
was therefore possible that asking to judge simi-
larity first and only then to judge difference
within groups might have focused participants
on the former. Although such effects did not
emerge in their research when the same partici-
pants generated both similarities and differ-
ences (Murray et al., 1990, Study 2), we wanted
to rule out the possibility that the ordering of
similarity items influenced our substantive con-
clusions. Therefore, individuals in this experi-
ment judged differences between groups
before judging their similarity.
Method
Participants Altogether, 112 undergraduates
participated in exchange for partial course
credit. 
Stimulus materials The primary variables in
this study again were mood (good vs. neutral)
and expectancy (one group vs. two group), but
the mood manipulation and the nature of the
groups differed. The Velton (1968) procedure
was utilized to induce a good or neutral mood.
In this procedure, participants are provided
with a set of 60 statements that they read for 20
seconds each. These statements are either self-
referential and indicative of elated mood (i.e.
designed to induce a happy mood) or are unre-
lated to the self or to mood (i.e. to induce a
neutral mood). Because of the need to manip-
ulate mood before the presentation of infor-
mation about each group, participants
completed the procedure twice with 30 items in
each set.
New behavioral descriptions were used to
convey information about groups that tended
to be either friendly or intelligent but were also
highly variable. These descriptions were based
on ratings (N = 20) of 60 new behavioral items
for both intelligence and friendliness on a 9-
point scale. These ratings were used to create
12-item sets describing Group A, whose
members were friendly (M = 6.4) but neutral
with regard to intelligence (M = 5.1), and
Group B, whose members were intelligent (M =
6.4) but neutral with regard to friendliness (M
= 5.0). Both groups showed a high level of vari-
ability around these averages (SDs = 1.7 and 1.6,
respectively).
Procedure Procedures for Experiments 2 and
3 were similar. In both experiments, partici-
pants completed two mood inductions to
induce a good or neutral mood and formed
impressions of two groups under a one-group
or two-group expectancy. However, partici-
pants’ moods in Experiment 3 were manipu-
lated through use of the Velten (1968)
procedure. After the first mood induction,
participants completed a mood manipulation
check and then read the items describing
behaviors performed by the members of Group
A, one at a time for six seconds each. To clear
short-term memory, participants then were
handed a map of the United States with state
boundaries but no state names indicated. They
were asked to write the name of each state
within its boundaries, and they were given three
minutes to complete this task. After two
minutes, free recall was collected for three
minutes. Participants then completed the intra-
group similarity scale for that group. Partici-
pants completed this procedure again, except
they were provided with descriptions of behav-
iors performed by Group B. After both impres-
sion formation and recall tasks were completed,
participants judged the similarity of the two
groups (with items about difference appearing
first).
Results and discussion
Effectiveness of mood manipulations Because
responses to the manipulation check items were
highly correlated for both mood inductions
(rs = .78 and .82, respectively), they were
averaged and analyzed using a 2 (Mood)  2
(Expectancy)  2 (Induction) ANOVA with
Stroessner et al. mood and variability
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repeated measures on the last factor. Partici-
pants in the positive mood conditions reported
being happier (M = 7.0) than participants in the
neutral mood condition (M = 5.3) (F(1, 108) =
111.20, p < .001). No other effects were signifi-
cant, suggesting that the mood manipulation
was equally effective for both inductions. 
Free recall A 2 (Mood)  2 (Expectancy)  2
(Group) ANOVA of free recall produced only a
significant effect of Mood (F(1, 108) = 8.06, p <
.01). Participants in a neutral mood recalled
more items overall than did participants in a
good mood (Ms = 12.2 vs. 10.7, respectively).
These recall data, collected before other judg-
ments were collected, provide clearer evidence
of differences in systematic processing between
individuals in a good and neutral mood.
Effects of mood on perceptions of variability
Within-group similarity An analysis of within-
group variability judgments again yielded an
Expectancy effect (F(1, 108) = 10.04, p < .01),
qualified by a three-way interaction (F(1, 108) =
5.53, p < .05). An analysis of the judgments of
Group A produced a Mood effect (F(1, 108) =
6.59, p < .05), an Expectancy effect (F(1, 108) =
10.39, p < .01), and a two-way interaction (F(1,
108) = 5.84, p < .05). Replicating the pattern of
findings in Experiment 2, happy individuals
who expected to learn about one group judged
the group as more similar than did individuals
in a neutral mood (Ms = 5.4 vs. 4.0, respec-
tively) (F(1, 108) = 13.05, p < .01). Under the
expectation of two groups, however, there was
no difference between the mood conditions
(Ms = 5.6 vs. 5.5) (p = .92). There were no
significant effects for judgments of Group B. As
in Experiment 2, neutral mood facilitated the
recognition of diversity only under the expec-
tation of a single group. 
Between-group differentiation Consistent with
the previous two experiments, individuals in a
positive mood perceived the groups as more
similar (F(1, 108) = 6.34, p < .05), and less
different (F(1, 108) = 6.25, p < .05), than did
individuals in a neutral mood (See Table 3).
Judgments on the specific traits yielded parallel
findings. On judgments of friendliness, happy
participants viewed the groups as marginally
more similar (F(1, 108) = 3.05, p = .08), and
marginally less different (F(1, 108) = 3.10, p =
.08), than did participants in a neutral mood.
On judgments of intelligence, happy partici-
pants viewed the groups as more similar (F(1,
108) = 5.31, p < .05), and less different (F(1,
108) = 4.13, p < .05), than did participants in a
neutral mood. Thus, happy mood decreased
differentiation even with different question
ordering, and the effects were apparent on
both traits on which the groups differed in this
experiment. 
Mediational analyses Mediational analyses
were conducted to test causal role of delibera-
tive processing in perceptions of within- and
between-group variability. Differences in delib-
erative processing were hypothesized to
account for differences between mood groups
in the recognition of high within-group vari-
ability. However, these relations were expected
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(1)
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only for the first group encountered and only
under a one-group expectancy. To test this, a
series of regression analyses were performed
(Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998) using codes for
the different mood conditions and measures of
deliberative processing (i.e. free recall for each
group) and similarity (i.e. the within-group
similarity item). As predicted, evidence for
mediation was obtained only in the one-
expectancy condition for the judgment of the
first group. In this condition, mood predicted
similarity (β = .22; t(56) = 2.4, p < .05), and free
recall (β = –.27; t(56) = –3.0, p < .01). Most
important for establishing mediation, free
recall predicted similarity after controlling for
mood (β = –.26; t(56) = –2.8, p < .01). The
impact of mood on similarity was significantly
reduced when the mediator was included
(Sobel test, Z = –2.0, p < .05). 
To examine the causal role of deliberation in
the relation between mood and differentiation,
regression analyses were performed using
codes for mood groups and measures of delib-
erative processing (i.e. total free recall) and dif-
ferentiation between groups (i.e. the average of
the general difference and reverse-scored
general similarity items). Mood predicted dif-
ferentiation (β = –.25; t(110) = –2.7, p < .01),
and free recall (β = –.27; t(110) = –3.0, p < .01),
and free recall predicted differentiation after
controlling for mood (β = .25; t(109) = 2.7, p <
.01). The impact of mood on differentiation
was reduced significantly when the mediator
was included (Sobel test, Z = –2.0, p < .05).4
These analyses indicate that deliberative pro-
cessing mediated the relationship between
mood, similarity, and differentiation as hypoth-
esized. 
General discussion
Three studies showed that mood affects the
perception of differences within and between
novel groups. Perceivers in a positive mood
were less likely to differentiate between two
groups whose members were, on average, quite
different from each other. Judgments of vari-
ability within each group, however, were
affected in more complex ways. Intragroup vari-
ability judgments were affected both by mood
states and expectations about the number of
groups to be encountered. These results have
implications for theories of mood and cognitive
processing, for the literatures on group differ-
entiation and homogeneity, and for theories
focusing on the consequences of intergroup
contact. We discuss these implications in turn.
Mood and cognitive processing
These studies were not designed to distinguish
mood theories, but they nonetheless speak to
several issues relevant to differing accounts of
mood. First, it is clear that positive mood did
not produce highly deliberative processing as it
has in some other contexts. Although positive
moods can lead to generative, varied, and
flexible responses to stimuli, these results typi-
cally emerge when tasks are engaging and
enjoyable (Isen, 1999). In the context of an
impression formation task demanding atten-
tion and effortful deliberation to ensure
accuracy, positive mood clearly undermined
deliberative processing. As we have argued
above, however, the consequences of reduced
processing were mixed in regard to intergroup
perception. Whereas perceptions of homo-
geneity were increased, intergroup differentia-
tion was diminished. 
Second, these results cannot easily be
explained by models focusing on the increased
reliance of individuals in a happy mood on pre-
existing knowledge structures (Bless, Schwarz,
& Kemmelmeier, 1996; Bodenhausen et al.,
1994; Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2000). Although
there are considerable data supporting this
account when existing groups are involved, this
account is largely silent regarding the formation
of impressions of novel groups. No pre-existing
stereotypes existed of the novel groups we used
in our studies, and therefore, it was not surpris-
ing that mood had no impact on judgments of
the traits possessed by group members. Instead,
the effects of mood were revealed primarily on
perceived variability within and between groups,
judgments reliant on the ability to systematically
process information about similarities and
differences. Therefore, where novel groups are
involved, theories that focus on the processing
Stroessner et al. mood and variability
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deficits associated with positive mood are most
likely to hold sway (Mackie & Worth, 1991;
Schwarz, 1990).
Mood and the perception of differences
between groups
Positive mood decreased the differentiation
between the two novel groups, in part because
happiness reduced deliberative processing of
available information. In two experiments,
happy participants recalled less information
about the groups, and Experiment 3 showed
that the amount of recall was shown to mediate
the relation between mood and differentiation.
So, for these very different novel groups,
positive mood appeared to decrease differenti-
ation by decreasing the thoroughness of pro-
cessing. 
Decreased thoroughness of processing under
positive mood should not always reduce differ-
entiation. If there were no real group differ-
ences, in fact, positive mood might lead to
greater differentiation. This might occur if per-
ceivers in a positive mood simply rely on group
labels to infer differences where none, in fact,
exist. This is exactly what was found in a recent
paper by Abele, Gendolla, and Petzold (1998).
In their studies, individuals underwent a
positive mood or no mood induction after
being divided into groups via the minimal
group paradigm. Participants in the positive
mood conditions were more likely to discrimi-
nate between ingroup and outgroup members
in evaluative ratings, suggesting that they saw
the members of the ingroup and outgroups as
particularly distinct compared with those
participants in a neutral mood. In the Abele et
al. study, there were no actual differences
between groups (because of the random assign-
ment of participants into groups), whereas the
groups in our study were created to differ sub-
stantially from each other. Therefore, we
suggest that our findings are compatible with
those of Abele et al. in that participants in a
neutral mood were more accurate in detecting
the presence (or absence) of real group differ-
ences. In their study, where there were no
differences between the groups, participants in
a neutral mood were less likely to differentiate
between the groups in their evaluative ratings.
In our study, where there were group differ-
ences, participants in a neutral mood made
lower similarity ratings, indicating that they
accurately detected that the groups were
different. 
We suggest then that mood effects on differ-
entiation depend on the actual degree of differ-
ence between groups. If groups are highly
similar, then positive mood, due to the use of
group labels as a heuristic cue indicating differ-
ence, will increase perceived differences and
will facilitate between-group discrimination. If
groups are highly different, however, positive
mood would be expected to attenuate the per-
ception of difference. This allows for the possi-
bility that with a moderate degree of group
difference, individuals in a neutral and positive
mood might make equivalent judgments of
similarity. They might do so for different
reasons, however, due to deliberative process-
ing in the former and heuristic processing in
the latter condition.
Mood and the perception differences within
groups 
Judgments of intragroup variability were
affected in a more complex manner by mood.
Specifically, mood interacted with expectations
about the number of target groups to affect
perceived intragroup similarity. Participants in
a happy mood failed to detect the variability
within either group, regardless of whether they
expected to form an impression of one or two
groups. Participants in a neutral mood,
however, showed greater detection of variability
only when one group was expected. We suspect
that expectancies regarding the number of
groups prompted different processes during
the impression formation process. When two
groups were expected, we believe that partici-
pants did not focus their attentional resources
on detecting the variability within either group.
When only a single group was expected,
however, participants in a neutral mood paid
particular attention to the variability contained
within the first group encountered. Thus, for
participants in a neutral mood, the lower vari-
ability judgments in the condition in which two
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(1)
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groups were expected likely arose because of
differing information processing goals in a
multiple-group context, not because they were
unable or unwilling to process information
deliberately. 
Of course, the processing of information by
participants in a neutral mood was not so
thorough that they were able to detect within-
group variability when it was not the focus of
attentional resources. Participants in a neutral
mood had some ability to process the infor-
mation as evidenced by their ability to discrim-
inate between the two groups. Discriminating
between members of the same group, however,
was negatively affected by expectancies regard-
ing the number of target groups. Thus, it
appears that individuals in a neutral mood allo-
cated their somewhat limited attentional
resources on processing the information seen
as most relevant to the task at hand. On the one
hand, when detecting differences between
groups was seen as most informative or import-
ant (i.e. when forming impressions of two
groups), detection of within group variability
was neglected. On the other hand, when
making distinctions among group members
seemed most important (i.e. when forming an
impression of a single group), participants in a
neutral mood were more likely to detect the
high degree of variability within the group. To
our knowledge, this is the first time this effect
has been reported, and it seems to be an issue
worth pursuing in its own right. Future studies
could advance our understanding of these pro-
cessing differences by measuring attention to
behavioral information that denotes high vari-
ability under single versus multiple-group
expectations.
However, the finding that the focus of infor-
mation processing can shift as a function of an
interaction between perceiver characteristics
and the informational environment is not
without some precedent. This finding is anal-
ogous to one reported by Pendry and Macrae
(1999), who examined the impact of cognitive
load and variability on the formation of an
impression of a single novel group. They found
that under optimal processing conditions,
participants tended to recall more stereotypic
information when the group was homogeneous,
but more counterstereotypic information
when the group was heterogeneous. Under
reduced cognitive capacity, however, partici-
pants tended to recall stereotypic information,
regardless of the variability of the group. The
similarity of the results in their high cognitive
load and our positive mood conditions is con-
sistent with our interpretation that our effects
emerged because of the processing deficits
associated with positive mood. 
Implications for intergroup perception 
Positive mood appears to have both beneficial
and detrimental consequences for group per-
ception. Although happiness appears to
decrease perceived variability within groups, it
can also make distinctive groups appear to be
similar. In addition, some evidence suggests
that positive mood decreases the distinction of
the self from an undesirable group, suggesting
that individuals in a positive mood might be
more willing to interact with members of
disliked outgroups. 
In addition to highlighting the complex role
of mood in the formation of group impressions,
these data are also suggestive about how group
information might ideally be presented when
individuals are in a neutral mood. It appears as
if the informational context is a factor that can
influence whether the variability within a group
is detected. If individuals believe they will form
an impression of a single group, they are likely
motivated to form both an impression of a
groups’ typical characteristics (i.e. the central
tendency) and the degree that members of the
group differ from what is typical for the group
(i.e. intragroup variability). If individuals
receive information about multiple groups (or
merely when they expect to do so), the detection
of variability within the groups is attenuated.
Under these circumstances, individuals are
likely motivated to attend more to detecting the
typical characteristics of the group to allow a
comparison with other groups who will be
encountered. Consequently, the variability
within the group may be perceived as less
important, given the perceivers’ emphasis on
comparing one group with another.
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Therefore, it may be beneficial to de-
emphasize comparisons with other groups
when presenting individuals with information
describing novel groups. If individuals are
forming impressions of an unfamiliar group,
the variability within the group might thus be
better recognized from the outset. Once an
impression of a single group has been formed,
comparisons between groups might then be
emphasized without negatively affecting the
recognition of variability within the groups
being compared. It appears that the mere
expectation of multiple targets is sufficient to
reduce the detection of differences within
either group. Given the increasing diversity of
contemporary social environments, further
consideration of the impact of learning about
groups in isolation or through explicit com-
parison with others might prove beneficial.
Notes
1. The variability of these behavioral sets was similar
to the highly variable (HV) set used in Stroessner
and Mackie (1992).
2. One participant did not respond to the item
about general difference and another to the
question about similarities in friendliness.
Analyses excluding these participants yielded
similar results.
3. We thank two anonymous reviewers for their
comments that prompted these modifications.
4. Mediational analyses in which the mood
manipulation check data served as the predictor
variable yielded similar results.
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